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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF DUTCHESS
In the Matter of the Application of
Index No.

Petitioner,
For a judgment pursuant to Alticle 78 of the Civil
Practice Law and Rules,

Judge:

-againstTINA M. STANFORD, Chai1woman of the New
York State Board of Parole
Respondent.

VERIFIED PETITION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 78
by his undersigned attorneys, for his petition against

Petitioner
respondents, alleges as follows:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1.

- - brings this action pursuant to Alticle 78 of the New York Civil

Practice Law and Rules to vacate the Febrnaiy 2021 decision of the New York State Board of
Parole (the "Board") denying him release on parole. Mr. -

is a 52-year-old grandfather

who has been incai·cerated for 30 years--over half of his life-based on criminal acts for which
he was convicted when he was 21 -years-old. In the intervening decades he has grown to become
a devoted husban d to his wife

, a father who works every day to make up for his

time in incarceration and away from his sons

, and a new

grandfather to his 17-month-old granddaughter.
2.

Mr. -

is serving an indeterminate te1m for two counts of attempted mmder

in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees- a
minimum sentence of 30 years and a maximum of life. Given Mr. -

age, personal growth,

and ties to the community, he is no longer a threat to commit any violent or nonviolent crime.

13279698

1 of 28

I has paid his debt to society.

Mr. I
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Mr. -

should be granted parole and released so

that he can do whatever he can to make up for lost time with his children and have an
opportunity to be the grandfather his granddaughter deserves.
3.

In Febmary 2021, Mr. -

became eligible for release on parole. He appearnd

before a panel of commissioners who summarily denied him release in a concluso1y decision.
By relying on an eIToneous and incomplete record, the Board committed reversible errors for
which Mr. 4.

should be granted a de nova hearing.
First, the Board eITed when it issued its decision in reliance upon an inaccurate

and now outdated COMPAS assessment. To the extent the Board gave a reason for its decision,
they relied upon a flawed COMPAS assessment that misjudged Mr. . . . . propensity for
prison misconduct based on an eIToneous notation that Mr. -

had a Tier 3 infraction, when

he in fact did not. In their written decision the Board "heavily weighed" Mr. -

inc01Tect

"High" prison misconduct score and used it as their prima1y reason for detennining that Mr.
-

would be unable or unwilling to follow the law if released. But that COMPAS

assessment was coITected subsequent to the parole hearing, and the coITected assessment
accurately described his prison misconduct score as "Low." ( Compare Bose Aff., Ex. 6,
COMPAS Report in Parole File, with Bose Aff. , Ex. 7, CoITected COMPAS Rep01t.)
5.

Second, the Board eITed when it issued its decision on the basis of a record that

was incomplete and, beyond just the COMPAS assessment, othe1w ise eIToneous. The Board
failed to consider that the record before them was incomplete as it lacked: (i) sentencing minutes
from Justice Failla in Mr. I

I underlying conviction (Id. (box checked "No" next to

"Sentencing Minutes")); (ii) an incomplete institutional repo1t (e.g. Mr.

biith ce1tificate

was not included, which may put into dispute his depo1tation order); and (iii) letters from the
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police, district attorney, and sentencing comi (see Bose Aff., Ex. 4, Parole Board Repo1i (box
checked ''No" next to "Official Statements")); among other missing records. 1
6.

For the reasons set fo1th in detail below, the Parole Board' s decision should be

reversed because the record the Board considered during Mr. -

Febmary 9, 2021 parole

hearing contained at least fom serious e1rnrs. First, the Board relied on an inaccmate COMP AS
Risk and Needs Assessment that was only conected by the prison Counselor after the hearing.

Second, the Board relied on a version of Mr. I

I re-entry plan that contained enors

including a release address that was inconectly recorded by his prison Counselor and which led
to confusion at the hearing. Third, the Board considered an order of depo1tation that is not only
missing from the record, but is also likely e1rnneous, as Mr. -

maintains that his biith

ce1tificate (also missing from the record) would prove his United States citizenship. Fourth , the
record the Board considered is also missing statements from defense counsel and District
Attorney, and sentencing minutes. Each of these enors are independent grounds for annulling
parole denial and granting a de novo interview.

Mr. 7.

Next, the Board's decision was contra1y to law, arbitraiy, and capricious for

several additional reasons. The Board: (1) issued a boile1plate decision that lacked sufficient
individualized analysis ai1d didn't address the thii·d of Executive Law § 259-i(2)(A)'s three
prongs; (2) failed to consider that Mr. I

I age makes him highly unlikely to collllllit

weapon-related crimes in the futme; (3) improperly considered Mr. . . . . decision not to take
a plea deal- a factor inelevant to the Board's inquii·y; and (4) improperly emphasized the
seriousness of crimes Mr. -

committed neai·ly 30 years ago, making its decision an illegal

resentencing based on its own concept of justice.

The tmdersigned has filed a FOIL and a 9 NYCRR § 8000.5 request with Woodbow11e Cotl'ectional
Facility for the missing docmnents. (See Bose Aff., Exs. 8 and 9.)
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8.

Therefore, the Board's denial violates New York State Executive Law,

CotTections Law, adininistrative regulations, and controlling state case law. This Court should
vacate the Board's decision and order a properly conducted de novo parole release inte1view.
VENUE
9.

Venue is proper in this Comt pursuant to CPLR §§ 506(b) and 7804(b) because

Dutchess Cormty is where the Board conducted Mr. -

parole inte1view and made the

decision to deny him parnle. An Article 78 petition may be filed in "any cormty within the
judicial district where the respondent made the detennination complained of." CPLR § 506(b)
and§ 7804(b). Thus, this action is properly commenced in Dutchess Cormty. (Bose Aff. , Ex. 3.)
FACTS

I submits this brief in supp01t of a timely filed notice of

10.

administrative appeal. Mr. -

is a 52-year-old man who has been incarcerated for 30

years-over half of his life- for a crime he was an-ested for and convicted of when he was just
21 years old.
11.

Mr. -

is se1ving an indeterminate tenn for two cormts of attempted murder

in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees with a
minimum sentence of 30 years and a maximum of life.
12.

M r . - is a 52-year-old grandfather who has been incarcerated for 30 years-

over half of his life-based on criminal acts for which he was convicted when he was 21-yearsold. In the inte1vening decades he has grown to become a devoted husband to his w i f e -

1, a father who works eve1y day to make up for his time in incarceration and away from
his sons

and

, and a new grandfather to his 17-month-old
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I age and growth during incarceration, he is no longer a threat

to commit any violent or nonviolent crime.

13.

Mr.-

In Febmaiy 2021, he became eligible for release on parole. Prior to appeai·ing

before the panel,

filed a C.P.L. § 440.10 action challenging his underlying

conviction. He appeared before a panel of commissioners who smnmai·ily denied him release in
a conclusory decision. However, the Boa1·d collllllitted reversible errors that compel vacatur.
14.

First, the Board erred when it issued its decision on the basis of an incomplete

record. The Board failed to consider that the record before them was incomplete as it lacked: (i)
sentencing minutes from Justice Failla in Mr. -

underlying conviction (Id. (box checked

''No" next to " Sentencing Minutes")); (ii) an incomplete institutional rep01i (e.g. Mr. birth certificate was not included, which would put into dispute his depo1iation order as Mr.
-

maintains that he was born in Westchester, New York); and (iii) letters from the police,

district attorney, and sentencing comi (see Bose Aff., Ex. 4, Parole Board Rep01i (box checked
''No" next to "Official Statements")); among other missing records. The undersigned has filed a
FOIL and a 9 NYCRR § 8000.5 request with Woodbomne Correctional Facility for Mr. missing documents. (See Bose Aff., Exs. 8 and 9.)
15.

Second, the Board erred when it issued its decision in reliance upon multiple

pieces of erroneous iufo1mation, including an e1rnneous COMPAS assessment. To the extent the
Boai·d gave a reason for its decision, they relied upon a flawed COMPAS assessment that
misjudged Mr. . . . . propensity for prison misconduct based on an erroneous answer to
Question 16 stating that Mr. -

had a Tier 3 infraction, when he in fact did not. In their

written decision the Board "heavily weighed" Mr.

incorrect "High" prison misconduct

score and used this score as their primai·y reason for dete1mining that Mr. -
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lmable or oowilling to follow the law if released. (Compare Bose Aff. , Ex. 6, COMPAS Report
in Parole File, with Bose Aff. , Ex. 7, Conected COMPAS Repo1t.)
16.

On December 14, 2020, before Mr.

interview before the Board, a new

Coooselor prepared his COMPAS repo1t. This repo1t rated Mr. -

low risk for felony

violence, anest, or abscondment. (Bose Aff., Ex. 6, Enoneous COMPAS.). The COMPAS
repo1t scored him "low" for criminal involvement, low for histo1y of violence, but incorrectly

scored him "high" for prison misconduct. Id. The COMPAS repo1t also rated him as being
oolikely to experience negative social cognitions or low self-efficacy upon release, and scores
him as oolikely to experience low family supp01t. Id.
17.

However, as Mr. -

explained at his hearing, this enoneous "high" rating for

prison misconduct was the result of his Coooselor inconectly entering his involootaiy protective
custody (IPC) as a Tier III infraction, answering " 1" to Question 16, which asks "Total# of Tier
3 infractions dming the past 24 months of incarceration." (Bose Aff., Ex. 6, EIToneous
COMPAS at 3.) Mr. -

attempted to explain the incident to the Board:

Q: ... [Y]om last TierIII was in 2016 but in August of 2020 you
were placed in confinement. Protective custody, I'm sorry. Right,
protective custody?
A: That's conect.
Q: What were you in protective custody for?
A: I was doing exercise and one of the cables broke and the cable
hit me so I went to the officers and I rep01ted it, the next day an
info1mant said that somebody had hit me so they put me in
protective custody.
[Describes that the informant is "of the facility."]
Q: Why would the informant say that if you were exercising and
you hit yourself in the head with a cable?
A: I don't know.
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Q: And you never questioned it?
A : Of course I questioned it.
Q: And what did they say?
A : They said that since the info1mant said I was involved in a fight
they didn't want to take the chance of putting me back into the
population for three or four days.
(Bose Aff. , Ex. 3 at 9.)
18.

Mr. -

requested a coITected COMPAS Assessment and one was provided to

him on March 9, 2021 , w ith a cover letter drafted by a Senior Offender Rehabilitation
Coordinator ("SORC") that reads, "Enclosed please find your coITected COMPAS Risk
Assessment." (Bose Aff. , Ex. 7, CoITected COMPAS at 4.) While this coITected COMPAS
repo1i again scores him low risk for felony violence, aITest and abscondment, and scores him low
for criminal involvement and histo1y of violence, it now rates him at low risk for prison

misconduct. (Id. at 5.)
19.

A comparison of the two COMPAS rep01is shows that this lower rating is due to

the answer to Question No. 16: in the e1rnneous COMPAS repo1i, Mr. repo1i ed that Mr. -

counselor

had one previous Tier 3 infraction in the past 24 months of

incarceration. This was incoITect. hi the updated rep ort, a supervisor coITects his COMPAS and
repo1is that Mr. incai·ceration. Mr.

had zero previous Tier 3 infractions in the past 24 m onths of
was placed into protective custody only for his safety, and not for an

infraction. (Bose A ff. , Ex. 3 at 9.) The original Counselor incorrect~y recorded a Tier 3

infraction in the past 24 months in the erroneous COMPAS before the board, and it served as the
centerpiece for the Board's decision to place "heavy weight" on Mr. -

p rison misconduct

as evidence that he could not "live and remain at libe1ty without violating the law ." Executive
Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A); (Bose Aff. , Ex. 3 at 15 ("The Panel does not depa1t from your
-713279698

7 of 28

FUSL000144

low/unlikely COMPAS risk scores, however weighs heavily the high risk score for prison
misconduct. Your inability to follow rnles while confined leads the Panel to question your
ability to follow the law.") It was an e1rnr to repo1t that Mr.

had one such prior offense

before updating his CO:MPAS assessment during his initial hearing.
20.

This eITor appears to be the sole basis for the increase in Mr. -

score from

low risk for prison misconduct to high risk of prison misconduct. Indeed, aside from Question
No. 16, no other answers to the screening questions changed between the two reports. (Compare
Bose Aff. , Ex. 7, CoITected COMPAS with Bose Aff., Ex. 6, EIToneous COMPAS.)
21.

Third, the Board eITed when it issued its decision in reliance upon multiple pieces

of eIToneous infonnation, including another enor by the Counselor regarding Mr. -

release

plan. The Board stated that " (Y]our release plan waITants attention. In the interview you
provided a proposed residence other than that noted in the record. Your employment assurance
letter was well noted." (Bose Aff., Ex. 3 at 15.) M r . - attempted to raise with the Board
that his proposed residence was incoITectly recorded by his Counselor, during the following
exchange:
Q: ... If you' re released today, where are you gonna (sic] live?
A: I will live with my wife.
Q: And who is

(phonetic)?

A: That's my aunt.
Q: What happened to her?
A: When they did this they did this wrong, that was the alternative
address, the other one isn't put there.
Q: Did you bring that to the attention of your counselor?
A:Yes.
Q: And your counselor said?
-813279698
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A: My counselor said to fix it here when I anived here but it was
too late to fix it.
(Bose Aff. , Ex. 3 at 6-7.)
22.

As documented in subsequent fo1mal and info1mal grievance reports, Mr.

raised with his Counselor that the conect release address would need to be changed in his fonnal
Parole File to his wife's, Ms.

, address in

NY. (Bose Aff., Ex.

10, Info1mal Grievance; Bose Aff., Ex. 11, F01mal Complaint.) The Board subsequently relied
on the Counselor's error to render its decision and to demonstrate that Mr. I

I release

address was inconectly noted. The Board did not ask any further questions about the
discrepancy or offer Mr. 23.

an opportunity to conect the record.

M r . - timely filed a notice of administrative appeal, and submitted a timely

administrative appeal of the Board' s order to the Appeals Unit of the Board of Parnle on August
12, 2021. (Bose Aff. , Ex. 1.) On October 15, 2021 , the Board affnmed the denial of parole.
(Bose Aff., Ex. 5.) Accordingly, M r . - has exhausted his administrative remedies and this
matter is ripe for the instant Atticle 78 proceeding. This instant petition is also properly filed
within the applicable fom-month statute oflimitations. See CPLR § 217(1).
CAUSES OF ACTION

I.

FOUR TECHNICAL ERRORS IN THE RECORD MERIT VACATUR AND DE
NOVO REVIEW
A.

First Technical E"or - The Board Relied on an Inaccurate COMPAS
Assessment to Justify its Denial Decision

24.

Petitioner repeats and realleges each and eve1y allegation previously set forth in

this petition in paragraphs 1 through 23.
25.

The Board's decision should be vacated because it was premised on a flawed

COMPAS risk assessment repo1t that the Depaiiment of Conections and Community
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I parole board hearing.

Supervision cotTected on March 9, 202 1, one month after Mr. I

(Bose Aff. , Ex. 7, CotTected COM P AS at 4 ("Enclosed please find your cotTected COMPAS
Risk Assessment."))

The Board cited an older, eIToneous COMPAS repo1t multiple times in

reaching its decision, specifically giving additional weight to an incotTectly notated "High"
prison misconduct rating in explaining its rationale for denying Mr. -

parole. (Bose Aff. ,

Ex. 6, En oneous COMPAS.) The con ected COMPAS risk rep01t scores Mr. -

at a low

risk for every factor, including prison misconduct. (Bose Aff. , Ex . 7, Con ected COMPAS.)
26.

The Board wrote that it considered " ... [Mr· I

I discipline and [his]

COMPAS Risk Assessment" and that while it "does not depart from [his] low/unlikely
COMP AS risk scores," the Board "however weighs heavily the high risk score for prison
misconduct." (Bose A ff , Ex. 3 at 15 (emphasis added).) The COMPAS repo1t before the
Commissioners enoneously showed his Prison Misconduct score to be " High- 8." (Bose Aff. ,
Ex. 6, Enoneous COMPAS.) However, the corrected COMPAS score shows Mr. -

Prison

Misconduct score is actually a " Low - I." (Bose Aff. , Ex. 7, Con ected COMPAS.) The Board
expressed paiticular concern that Mr. -

institutional accomplishments w ere outweighed by

the enoneous "high risk score for prison misconduct." (Id.) That is, the Board's decision hinged
high score for prison misconduct- but this score was based on inaccurate

on Mr.
info1mation .
27.

In advance of Mr.-

interview before the Boai·d, a COMPAS rep ort was

prepai·ed on December 14, 2020. This report rated Mr. -

low risk for felony violence,

an est, or abscondment. (Bose Aff , Ex . 6, En oneous COMPAS.). It scored him low for criminal
involvement, low for histo1y of violence, but high for prison misconduct. Id. It also rated him as
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being unlikely to experience negative social cognitions or low self-efficacy upon release, and
scores him as unlikely to experience low family support. Id.
28.

However, as Mr.

explained at his hearing, this high rating for prison

misconduct was the result of his Counselor incon ectly entering his involuntary protective
custody (IPC) as a Tier III infraction, answering " 1" to Question 16, which asks "Total # of Tier
3 infractions during the past 24 months of incai·ceration." (Bose Aff. , Ex. 6, En oneous
COMPAS at 3.)
29.

Mr. -

requested a con ected COMP AS Assessm ent and one was provided to

him on M arch 9, 202 1, with a cover letter drafted by a Senior Offender Rehabilitation
Coordinator ("SORC") that reads, "Enclosed please find your conected COMPAS Risk
Assessment." (Bose Aff. , Ex. 7, Conected COMPAS at 4 .) While this con ected COMPAS
repo1t again scores him low risk for felony violence, a1Test and abscondment, and scores him low
for criminal involvement and hist01y of violence, it now rates him at low risk for prison

misconduct. (Id. at 5.)
30.

A compai·ison of the two COMPAS repo1ts shows that this decreased rating is due

to Question N o. 16: in the e1rnneous COMPAS report, Mr. Mr.

had one previous Tier 3 infraction in the past 24 months of incarceration . This was

incon ect. In the updated repo1t , M r. -

social worker repo1ied that

SORC con ects his COMPAS and repo1is that Mr.

had zero previous Tier 3 infractions in the past 24 months of incarceration . Mr. -

was placed into IPC only for his safety, and not for an infraction . (B ose Aff. , Ex . 3 at 9.) The

social worker incorrectly recorded a Tier 3 infraction in the past 24 months in the erroneous
COMPAS before the board, and it served as the centerpiece for the Board's decision to place
"heavy weight" on Mr. -

prison misconduct as evidence that he could not " live and
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remain at liberty without violating the law." Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A); (Bose Aff. , Ex. 3
at 15 ("The Panel ... weighs heavily the high risk score for prison misconduct. Your inability to
follow rnles while confined leads the Panel to question your ability to follow the law.")) It was
an en or to report that Mr. -

had one such prior offense before updating his COMPAS

assessment during his initial hearing.
31.

This en or appears to be the sole basis for the increase in Mr. -

score from

low risk for prison misconduct to high risk of prison misconduct. Indeed, aside from Question
N o. 16, no other answers to the screening questions changed between the two rep01is. (Compare
Bose A ff. , Ex. 7, Con ected COMPAS to Bose Aff. , Ex. 6, Enoneous COMPAS.)
32.

The increase in M r . - repo1ied risk of prison misconduct between his 2019

COMPAS repo1i and 2021 COMPAS report appears to be based on his new social worker
e1TOneous notation indicating that Mr. -

had a prior Tier 3 offense. That is not true, as his

con ected COMPAS repo1i and testimony before the Board accurately reported, and is a
historical fact that could not change in the interim.
33.

Because the Board's decision explicitly relied on an en oneous COMPAS score to

deny parole release by affording the score heavy weight, the Board's decision must be vacated.

Rivera v. Stanford, 201 9 WL 2030503, at *2 (2d Dep 't 2019).
B.

Second Technical Error - The Board Failed to Meaningfully Consider Mr.
Reentry Plans

34.

Petitioner repeats and realleges each and every allegation previously set fo1i h in

this petition in paragraphs 1 through 33.
35.

The Board 's governing statute explicitly requires the Board to consider "release

plans including community resources, employment, education and training and suppo1i services
available to the inmate" in making a release decision. N .Y. Exec. Law§ 259-i(c)(A)(iii). Yet,
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just like with his COMPAS report, the Boai-d failed to consider Mr. -

cotTected reentry

plan in rendering its decision. Since the Board considered failed to consider a statutorily
required factor, the denial was arbitrru-y and capricious and must be vacated.
36.

Mr. -

application for parole included a comprehensive reentry plan,

including documented familial and collllllunity support, Bose Aff., Ex. 2 at 22-32, and a letter of
reasonable assurance of a job offer upon his release, id. at 20. However, as Mr. -

testified

to and documented, see Bose Aff., Exs . 10 and 11, his parole file contained an inconect release
address. The Boru·d improperly considered and weighed this e1rnr against Mr. I
Board noted that Mr. -

I The

"provided a proposed residence other than that noted in the record,"

Bose Aff., Ex. 3 at 15, but failed to consider Mr. -

testimony that his counselor "did this

wrong ... the other [address] isn't put there," and that his "counselor said to fix it. .. when I atTived
[at the heru-ing]." Id. at 7-8. DOCCS later noted the enor. (Bose Aff., Ex. 7 at 4 ("Per our
conversation the address noted on your Parole Boru·d Repo1t can be updated if you ru·e granted a
De Novo appearance."))
37.

As documented in subsequent fo1mal and info1mal grievance reports, Mr. -

raised with his counselor that the conect release address would need to be changed in his f01mal
Parnle File to his wife's, Ms.

, address in

, NY. (Bose Aff., Ex.

10, Info1mal Grievance; Bose Aff. , Ex. 11, Fo1mal Complaint.) After questioning him regru·ding
the change in releas e address from his aunt to his wife, the Board did not conduct any further
inquiry into this enor, instead moving on to questions regarding the type of work he would be
doing upon release. (Bose Aff., Ex. 3 at 7.) However, in its decision, the Boru·d relied on the
Counselor's etTor to demonstrate that Mr.

release address was inconectly noted, without
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asking any fmther questions about the discrepancy or offering Mr. -

an oppo1tunity to

conect the record.
38.

Despite this written evidentiary record, it appears that the Board failed to give

meaningful consideration to a factor it is statutorily required to consider. As such, its decision
was arbitraiy and capricious. See Mayfield v. Evans, 93 A.D.3d 98, 110 (1st Dep't 2012) ("[T]he
absence of a detailed decision inappropriately foreclosed the possibility of intelligent review of
the Parole Boai·d member's reasons."). Indeed, Comts have regularly granted Atticle 78
petitions seeking review of Boai·d decisions that, like in Mr· I

I case, fail to consider all of

the statutory parole factors. See, e.g., Mitchell v. NY. State Div. of Parole, 58 A.D.3d 742, 743
(2d Dep't 2009). Fmther, comts have held that, when the Board fails to consider all relevant
statut01y factors, as it did in Mr. I

I case, it is "a strong indication that the denial of

petitioner's application was a foregone conclusion." Johnson v. New York State Div. ofParole,
65 A.D.3d 838, 839 (4th Dep't 2009) (citing King v. NY State Div. ofParole, 190 A.D.2d 423,
431-32 (1st Dept. 1993), aff'd, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994)). When the Board prejudges an applicant's
case, as it did here, that is grounds for vacatur. King, 190 A.D.2d at 434.

C.

Third Technical Error-The Board Failed to Meaningfully Consider Mr.
Citizenship Claim

39.

Petitioner repeats and realleges each and eve1y allegation previously set forth in

this petition in pai·agraphs 1 through 38.
40.

The Boai·d must consider an applicant's immigration status when rendering a

parole decision. Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A) (iv) ("any depo1tation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate while in the custody of the department and any
recommendation regarding deportation made by the commissioner of the depatiment...shall be
considered."). In this instance, the Board focused mostly on the seriousness of the crime of
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conviction during the interview. Due to the incomplete parole file before them, including the
missing depo1tation order and missing birth ce1tificate, the Board failed to meaningfully consider

41.

The Board decision states: "[t]he record notes an order of depo1tation. You have

asse1ted being born in Westchester, New York however have yet to provide proof." (Bose Aff.,
Ex. 3 at 15.) It appears that the Board was not provided with the entire record. The record does
not include a physical depo1tation order, nor does it include Mr. I

I bi1th ce1tificate.

Mr.

I has provided a Chronological Entry Sheet demonstrating that a request was filed for his
bi1th certificate on July 25 , 2017. (Bose Aff., Ex. 12.) Mr. -

has also provided an Inmate

Personal Property record that indicates that, as of Febrna1y 5, 2018, his bi1th ce1tificate was part
of his personal property, alongside his maniage license and cmTent high school diploma. (Bose
Aff., Ex. 13.) fustead of considering the entire inmate record, including Mr. certificate, which Mr. -

bi1th

Mr.-

insists will show that he is a United States citizen, the Board relied

on an inaccurate record that does not even include a physical depo1tation order.

and

the undersigned have both made efforts to secure his bitth ce1tificate. (See Bose Aff. , Exs. 8, 9
and 12.)
42.

Because the Board failed to meaningfully consider a factor that it is statutorily

requit·ed to consider, its decision must be vacated.

D.

Fourth Technical Error- The Board Failed to Request and Consider
Statements from Mr.. . . . Defense Counsel or the District Attorney, and
did not Consider Mr.
Sentencing Minutes

43.

Petitioner repeats and realleges each and eve1y allegation previously set forth in

this petition in paragraphs 1 through 42.
44.

When making a parole decision, the Board must consider "the recommendations

of the sentencing comt, the district attorney and the attorney who represented the inmate in
-1513279698
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connection with the conviction for which the inmate is cuITently incarcerated." 9 NYCRR
8002.2(d)(7). The Board failed to consider any of those recommendations here.
45.

The Board briefly, and confusingly, addressed the absence ofletters from Mr.

. . . . trial defense counsel, the trial judge, and the New York County District Attorney. The
Board stated: "It's customaiy that we write judges, defense attorneys and the DA regai·ding the
possibility of your release, we did not get any response from them so we will continue without
their input." (Bose Aff. , Ex. 3 at 10.) The Boai·d simply noted the practice that was
customaiy- it did not state anywhere in the transcript or decision that it affinnatively attempted
reaching out to any of the necessaiy parties in the lead up to the hearing.
46.

The Pai·ole Board Report supp01ts the fact that the Boai·d conducted no such

outreach in over seven years. After checking the "No" box after both Official Statements from
the judge, District Attorney, and defense counsel, and also after Sentencing Minutes, it states that
the last time such statements and minutes were requested was on December 19, 2013, and that at
the time of request, such statements were "Unavailable." (Bose Aff., Ex. 4 at 1.) According to
the Pai·ole Board Report, the last time statements and sentencing minutes were requested was

almost 8 years ago. There is nothing on the repo1t to indicate that the Board requested the
statements at issue again as the heai·ing approached. Because the Board appai·ently declined to
contact the judge, district attorney, or defense counsel, and, thus, did not consider any statement
they might have made regarding Mr. -

it failed to consider a required factor in reaching the

decision at issue.
47.

Additionally, the Boai·d appears not to have considered the minutes from Mr.

1992 sentencing hearing. (Bose Aff., Ex. 4, Parole Board Repo1t (box checked ''No"
next to "Sentencing Minutes").) These minutes would demonstrate that Justice Failla chose to
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give Mr. -

a sentence range below the statuto1y minimum-15-years-to-life on each

attempted murder charge instead of 20-to-life, for an aggregate sentence of 30-years-to-life, a
considerable departure from the statuto1y minimum sentence of 40-years-to-life. The transcript
of Mr. . . . . parole hearing and the Board's written decision are devoid of any reference to
Justice Failla's decision or to any other aspect of the sentencing minutes. The Board e1Ted by
neglecting to consider sentencing minutes in which the judge "implicitly addressed" parole by,
for example, "imposing less than the maximum on the lower range where [the judge] had
discretion," as Justice Failla did here. See Matter ofDuffy v. NY. State Dep 't of Corr. & Cmty.
Supervision, 132 A.D.3d 1207, 1208 (3d Dep't 2015); Canales v. Hammock, 105 Misc. 2d 71 ,
74, 431 N.Y.S.2d 787, 790 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (Board committed reversible e1rnr in failing to review
sentencing judge's minutes).
48.

Because the Board failed to consider statutorily required factors, its decision

must be reversed.
II.

FAILURE TO PROVIDE AN INDIVIDUALIZED AND NON-CONCLUSORY
EXPLANATION FOR DENYING PAROLE
49.

Petitioner repeats and realleges each and eve1y allegation previously set forth in

this petition in paragraphs 1 through 48.
50.

When the Board declines to grant parole, it is required by statute to provide a

decision "in writing ... of the factors and reasons for such denial of parole. Such reasons shall
be given in detail and not in conclusory te1ms." Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(a); see In re Rossakis
v. NY. State Bd. OfParole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 28 (1st Dep 't 2016); In re Ramirez, 118 A.D.3d 707,

707 (2d Dep't 2014). Specifically, the Board must explain its decision with reference to the
factors for parole set forth in Executive La:w § 259-i(2)(c)(A), i.e. , (1) why there is a reasonable
probability that the parole applicant would violate the law if released, (2) why release would be
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incompatible with the welfarn of society, and (3) why release would so deprecate the seriousness
of the offense as to unde1mine respect for the law. A failure to address each of these factors- as
occmTed here- is cause to vacate the denial and grant a de novo hearing.
51.

The Board's decision contains only a cursory reference to the first two prongs,

and omits any reference to the third prong of Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A), which requires it
to consider why release would so deprecate the seriousness of the offense as to undennine
respect for the law. The Board's failure to explain how, or if, it considered this prong also
violates its own regulations. See 9 § NYCRR 8002.3. Section 8002.3 states that "[r]easons for
the denial of parole release shall be given in detail, and shall, in factually individualized and nonconcluso1y tenns, address how the applicable parole decision-making principles and factors
listed in 8002.2 were considered in the individual's case." Id. This oversight merits vacatur of
the Board's decision.
52.

Additionally, while the Board pmpo1ted to consider the first and second prongs it

must address under Executive Law § 259-i(2)(A), it sUllllnarily concluded that Mr.. . . .
release "would be incompatible with the welfare and safety of society." (Bose Aff., Ex. 3 .) The
third prong is not considered even cmsorily. The Board's reliance on such boilerplate language
without providing any explanation about how it reached this cmso1y conclusion is insufficient to
demonstrate that it meaningfully balan ced these factors.
53.

The remainder of the Board's decision likewise lacked sufficient detail, in

violation of controlling statutes and caselaw. The Board smmnarily noted Mr. . . . . "Case
Plan, institutional adjustment, release plans, yom discipline and your COMPAS Risk
Assessment" and did not address these factors in detail but instead smmnarily concluded that
they were outweighed by Mr. . . . . "disciplinaiy histo1y," and e1rnneous, see infra Section C,
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"high risk for prison misconduct." (See Bose Aff. , Ex. 3 at 15.) This rote recitation falls short of
what is required to substantiate a denial of parole.
54.

Similar to In re McBride v. Evans, the Board's decision here did not address or

explain its conclusion that Mr. . . . . many positive factors were outweighed by crimes Mr.
-

was found to have committed 30 years ago. Fmthennore, without a detailed explanation

of this determination and of how the Board considered the statut01y factors in Mr. . . . . case,
Mr. -

is unable to prepare sufficiently for future parole hearings, beyond curs01y advice to

"spend ... time cleaning up your discipline, adhering to facility mles, and clarifying your release
plans." See In re Greene v. Smith, 52 A.D.2d 292, 294 (4th Dep 't. 1976) (explaining that " [t]he
objective in requiring the board to furnish reasons is to guide and to aid the prisoner in his
endeavor to retmn to society as a useful citizen").
55.

Because the Board failed to consider statutorily required factors, its decision must

be vacated.

Ill.

FAILURE TO CONSIDER THAT MR.
AGE MAKES HIM UNLIKELY
TO COMMIT WEAPONS-RELATED CRIMES IN THE FUTURE RENDER ITS
DECISION ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
56.

Petitioner repeats and realleges each and eve1y allegation previously set forth in

this petition in paragraphs 1 through 55.
57.

The Board must consider whether "there is a reasonable probability that, if such

inmate is released, he will live and remain at libe1ty without violating the law, and that his
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society .... " Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).
This assessment must be fo1ward-looking, focusing "primarily on who the person appearing
before the Parole Board is today and on whether that person can succeed in the community after
release." Thwaites, 934 N.Y.S.2d at 699 (quoting Professor Phillip M. Genty, Columbia Law
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School, "Changes to Parole Laws Signal Potentially Sweeping Policy Shift," NYLJ, September
1, 2011).
58.

Mr.

age is undeniably relevant to that inquiiy. There is significant

evidence of a strong coffelation between age and crime. See, e.g., Dana, Goldstein, The
Marshall Project, Too Old to Commit Crime? (March 20, 2015 at 1:00 p.m.), available at
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/20/too-old-to-commit-crime. As many studies have
shown, individuals are far less likely to commit violent crimes or dtug crimes after theii· 30s. See

id. Put simply, older people are less physically capable of representing a threat to anyone.
Indeed, as the Board coffectly identified (even iii the incoffect COMPAS report before them, see

infra Section VD, Mr. -

COMPAS report demonstrated that for his "risk and ce1tain

behaviors upon being released to the community... Everything is either low or unlikely." 2 (Bose
Aff., Ex. 3 at 10.) Mr. . . . . corrected COMPAS repo1t demonstrates that all of his risk and
behavioral factors are Low or Unlikely (Bose Aff., Ex. 7 at 5), which would qualify him for the
lowest level of parole supervision, which is an indication of minimal risk to society and minimal
risk ofreoffending, Matter of Ciaprazi v Evans, 52 Misc. 3d 1211(A), slip op. at *2, 2016 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 2741 , at *3 (Sup. Ct., Duchess Cty. 2016).
59.

Given the statuto1y factors they were mandated to consider, this issue should

have been top of mind for the Board, since they held a discussion about Mr. -

age, but

only a curso1y and concluso1y discussion of his growth. (See Bose Aff., Ex. 3 at 8-9.) Instead of
recognizing the many courses and letters of commendation and recommendation he received

2

The foll quote from Co1mnissioner Cruse reads: "[COMPAS] measlU'es yolU' risk and ce1tain behaviors
upon being released to the community. One is low risk, 10 is high risk, yolU' risk of felony violence is low, two,
arrest risk is low, absconding risk is low. Eve1ything is either low or tutlikely except yolU' prison misconduct which
we just talked about, your discipline, that's high, 8 of 10. You tmderstand that?" (Bose Aff., Ex. 3 at 10.) The
Commissioners were reading from an inaccurate COMPAS report (later corrected, see Bose Aff., Ex. 7) that
contained an input that mischaracterized a protective custody as an offense, taking Mr.
prison misconduct
score from Low to High. See infra, Section VI.
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during his time in prison, the Board focused on the infractions he gained over a lifetime of
growing up in a conectional facility, from his early 20s to his 50s, for which Mr. -

takes

responsibility, and acknowledges that he was a different man when he was younger. (Id. at 8
(regarding his infractions, Mr. -

notes "I can't give an excuse, I was ~mested young, I

wasn't thinking conectly at that time"); see also Bose Aff., Ex. 2 at 12 (letter from Lifers &
Long Te1mers Organization Reconciliation Workshop, confnming Mr. -

completion of a

sixteen-week workshop "developed to address and understand the internal and external steps that
lead to reconciliation" and stating that "Mr. -

has displayed a willingness, with insight

about his past toxic behaviors and engaged in ways to repair damage[] inflicted internally and
externally''); Bose Aff., Ex. 2 at 5-13 (documenting Mr. -

myriad rehabilitative programs

and educational achievements gained during a lifetime of confmement).) The Board did not
age as it related to his likelihood for recidivism. (Bose Aff., Ex. 3 at 10.)

consider Mr. 60.

The Board's only reference to Mr. -

coursework and growth is cursory and

e1rnneous, stating that "I see letters of the leaders of the Otisville Lifers and Long T enners
Organization, they're speaking to your training regarding COVID-19 as well as a range of
personal and emotional workshops." (Id. at 12.) In fact, Mr. -

did not receive "training

regarding COVID-19." Instead, the letter the Board referenced simply offered an apology for the
delay due to COVID-19 in their producing a letter of completion of Mr. I
course, where Mr. -

I"Why Forgive"

demonstrated an "understanding of the transformative powers of

reconciliation, displayed victim centered awareness, and empathy," not COVID-19 training.
(Compare Bose Aff., Ex. 3 at 12 with Bose Aff., Ex. 2 at 12-13.)

61.

These are critical facts that the Board overlooked, making its decision arbitrary

and capricious and meriting vacatur. See Thwaites, 934 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
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IV.

IMPROPER CONSIDERATION OF MR. . . . . . FAILURE TO TAKE A
PLEA DEAL FOR THE UNDERLYING CONVICTION, RENDERING ITS
DECISION INVALID

62.

Petitioner repeats and realleges each and eve1y allegation previously set forth in

this petition in paragraphs 1 through 61.
63.

A parole decision is invalid when "one of the Commissioners considered factors

outside the scope of the applicable statute, including penal philosophy" or the Commissioner's
personal opinion. In re King v. New York State Div. ofParole, 83 N.Y.2d 788, 791 (1994); see
also Rabenbauer v. NY State Dep 't of Corr. & C,nty. Supervision, 46 Misc. 3d 603, 608 (Sup.
Ct., Sullivan Cty. 2014) ("This comt has been 1mable to find any statut01y or case law that
authorizes parole board commissioners to infuse their own personal opinions or speculations into
the parole interview or process.").
64.

In this case, Mr. . . . . decision to maintain his innocence and not take the plea

deal that was offered to him in the underlying offense 30 years earlier was not relevant to any of
the factors listed in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Yet, the parole hearing transcript shows
that Commissioner Crnse held Mr. . . . . refusal to take a plea deal 30 years ago, and to admit
guilt, against him.
65.

At the hearing, Commissioner Crnse offered a brief description of the underlying

offense, and asked M r . - if his description is trne. However, M r . - having akeady
explained that he has a § 440 motion pending, declined to state whether Commissioner Crnse 's
description is "hue," as the perceived veracity of M r . - innocence was actively being
litigated in New York State comt. (See Bose Aff. , Ex. 3 at 3.) After discussing Mr. aggregate term of imprisonment of 30 years, Commissioner Crnse proceeded to ask Mr. whether he was offered a plea. Mr. -

explained that he was offered a plea but maintains his

innocence, as demonstI·ated by the § 440 motion. Commissioner Cmse proceeded to offer a
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telling opinion regarding the plea deal M r . - was offered 30 years ago. (See Bose Aff., Ex.
3 at 3 ("Three to nine, I guess you wish you had taken it, yes?").) Commissioner Crnse's
inappropriate focus on this topic at the hearing, despite Mr.

argument maintaining his

im1ocence, indicates that it may have affected his decision. To the extent that Commissioner
Crnse believed that Mr. -

should have taken the plea deal that was offered, and the

admission of guilt that such a plea required, Commissioner Crnse was not pennitted to consider
that personal opinion in deciding whether to support release.
66.

Because Commissioner Crnse considered a factor that is "outside the scope of the

applicable statute," the Board's decision must be vacated, and M r . - must be given a de

novo hearing. See In re King, 83 N.Y.2d at 791.

V.

THE BOARD GAVE IMPERMISSIBLE WEIGHT TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF
THE PAST OFFENSE
67.

Petitioner repeats and realleges each and eve1y allegation previously set forth in

this petition in paragraphs 1 through 66.
68.

It is settled law that the Board of Parole may not deny release solely on the basis

of the seriousness of the past offense that resulted in the person's incarceration, and in the
absence of aggregating factors. Matter ofMitchell v. NY. State Div. ofParole, 58 A.D.3d 742,
743 (2d Dep 't 2009); Matter ofFreidgood v. NYS Bd. OfParole, 22 A.D.3d 950, 951 (3rd Dep't
2005) (concluding that a parole denial that ignored factors such as the petitioner's expressions of
remorse and disciplinary record on the basis that petitioner's instant offense was violent was
"iirntional under the circumstances as to border on impropriety.") Indeed, indications that the
parole decision is based exclusively on the seriousness of the offense will suppo1t a finding that
the parole denial was "a foregone conclusion." In re Johnson v. NY. State Div. of Parole, 65
A.D.3d 838, 839 (4th Dep't 2009); see also In Re King, 190 A.D.2d at 432; In re Morris v. NY.
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State Dep 't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 40 Misc. 3d 226, 233, 963 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Sup. Ct.,
Columbia Cty. 2013) ("When, as here, the Parole Board focuses entirely on the nature of
petitioner's crime, there is a strong indication that the denial of parole is a foregone conclusion
that does not compo11 with statuto1y requirements.").
69.

Rather, the Board must consider the dynamic factors of prisoner development and

rehabilitation. In re Rios, 2007 WL 846561 , at *4-5. Moreover, even "a murder conviction per
se should not preclude parole." Id. Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to
meaningfully review and consider evidence of rehabilitation and suitability for release.
70.

The record contains such evidence: despite maintaining his innocence, Mr. -

has expressed remorse for the pain all patties have endured over the last 30 years. (See Bose
Aff., Ex. 2 at 47, Victim Apology Letter.) His institutional records demonstrate that he has
positively affected the people ai·ound him in many ways, including by completing training to be
an Alternatives to Violence Project Facilitator. (Id. at 9.) He has demonstrated that extensive
family and community suppo11 awaits him upon release, including that of his wife, children, and
the meaning he will derive from being a grandfather to his 17-month-old granddaughter. (Id. at
22-32.) He has developed cai·eer goals based upon the skills he has gained in DOCCS custody
and has a position at an insurance company waiting for him upon his release. (Id. at 20-21.)
And, given his age, he is no longer a threat to commit violent or nonviolent crimes.
71.

Despite this evidence, the Boai·d' s focus was backwards-looking. The Boai·d

focused extensively ai1d impe1missibly on the details sunounding the instant offense. Despite
asse1ting his desire to act on the advice of previously retained counsel and not say anything at the
hearing which could compromise his § 440 motion, the Board questioned Mr.

at length

about his offense, and about why he did not take a plea deal 30 yeai·s ago, and the written
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decision itself states that: "In your interview you denied your guilt in the instant offense and
repeated your pending motion to appeal your conviction. Despite your limitations in discussing
the instant offense, what you did discuss was ingenuine and confusing. When questioned, you

Mr.-

provided vague explanation [sic] and repeated yourself[,] standing on your denial of the instant
offense." In fact, in framing its analysis of Mr.. . . . case, the Board placed

in an

impossible bind, where to meet their standard of contrition he would have to reject the arguments
of innocence put forward in his § 440 appeal.
72.
focus on Mr. -

With no meaningful discussion of Mr. -

growth, and with an extensive

instant offence, all premised on an invalid COMPAS report that

demonstrated an incotTect risk weighting, the Board gave no meaningful consideration to Mr.

I rehabilitation or to his capacity to reenter society.

It is a stark admission that the Board

failed to take statutorily mandated factors into account.
73.

As such, Mr. -

was denied a meaningful opportunity to secure his release,

making the Board's decision arbitrary and capricious and requiring vacat:ur of the Board's
decision.

VI.

UNLAWFUL RESENTENCING BY FOCUSING HEAVILY ON MR.
BEHAVIOR30YEARSAGO
74.

Petitioner repeats and realleges each and eve1y allegation previously set fo1th in

this petition in paragraphs 1 through 73.
75.

The Board's denial on the basis of its subjective evaluation of Mr. . . . .

contention that he was in the "wrong place at the wrong time" 30 years ago, claiming that such
an innocence claim " [d]oesn't make sense," Bose Aff., Ex. 3 at 7, amounts to an illegal
resentencing. New York comis have held that, "in focusing exclusively on the petitioner's crime
as a reason for denying parole," a Parole Board is "in effect, re-sentencing petitioner to a
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sentence that excluded any possibility of parole since petitioner is powerless to change his past
conduct." In re Rios, 2007 WL 846561, at *4-5. "[A]s the Appellate Division has admonished,
under similar circumstances, such 're-sentencing' by the Parole Board 'reveal[s] a fundamental
misunderstanding of the limitations of administrative power."' Id. (citing King v. NY State Div.

of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 431 -32 (1st Dept. 1993), aff'd, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994)).
76.

While the Board may consider criminal histo1y during parole detenninations, its

heavy focus- almost half of the decision is committed to a description of such acts-on the acts
was convicted of committing in his 20s is improper. This conduct would have been

Mr. -

properly before Mr. . . . . sentencing judge, Justice Failla, who chose to impose a sentence of
to two consecutive te1ms of 15 years to life for each attempted murder conviction, to nm
concurrently with concmTent tenns of 5 to 15 years and 2
weapons convictions, see People v. -

~

to 7 years, respectively, for the

205 A.D.2d 404, 404, 613 N.Y.S.2d 879, 880 (1994),

for an aggregated sentence of 30-years-to life.
77.

The Board's focus on conduct that existed at the time of sentencing effectively

constitutes a resentencing to a higher minimum sentence. This effective resentencing is contrary
to law and merits vacatm .
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests th at the Comt enter an order:
1. Annulling the decision of Respondent, dated Febmary 9, 2021, denying Petitioner
- - parole release; and
2. Directing Respondent to immediately afford Petitioner a new, de novo parole
release hearing before a new panel that does not include any commissioner who
has previously denied Mr.

release, at which Respondent shall consider all

appropriate statut01y factors governing parole release dete1minations; and,
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3. Granting such additional relief as the Comt deems just and proper.

Dated: Febmaiy 11, 2022
New York, New York

Respectfully submitted,

By:
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ATTORNEY VERIFICATION
I, Rhick Bose, an attorney admitted to practice before the Comis of the State of New
York, affom the following to be trne under penalty of pe1jmy:
I am attorney at Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP and am counsel for the Petitioner.
I have read the foregoing Verified Petition and know the contents thereof. The statements
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- - brings this action pursuant to Atticle 78 of the New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules to vacate the Febrnary 2021 decision of the New York State Board of Parole (the
"Board") denying him release on parole. Mr. -

is a 52-year-old grandfather who has been

incarcerated for 30 years-over half of his life-based on criminal acts for which he was
convicted when he was 21-years-old. In the intervening decades he has grown to become a
devoted husband to his wife

, a father who works every day to make up for his

time in incarceration and away from his sons

and

, and anew

grandfather to his 17-month-old granddaughter.
Mr. -

is serving an indetenninate te1m for two counts of attempted murder in the

first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees- a minimum
sentence ofthnty years and a maximum of life. For thi1ty years, Mr. -

has maintained that

he was wrongfully aiTested with a group of other men while standing at a comer while a shooting
took place. (Bose Aff., Ex. 14, Pro Se Parole Appeal at 4.) Given Mr. -

age, personal

growth, and ties to the community, he is no longer a threat to commit any violent or nonviolent
crime. Mr. -

has paid his debt to society. Mr. -

should be granted parole and

released so that he can do whatever he can to make up for lost time with his children and have an
opportunity to be the grandfather his granddaughter dese1ves.
In Febrnai·y 2021, Mr. -

became eligible for release on parole. He appeared before

a panel of commissioners who smmnarily denied him release in a conclusory decision. By
relying on an enoneous and incomplete record, the Board committed reversible enors for which
Mr. -

should be granted a de novo hearing. 1

As documented in his Alticle 78 petition, the Board's decision was contra1y to law, arbitra1y, and
capricious for several additional reasons. The Board failed to address Mr. advanced age and growth over the

1
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First, the Boru·d ened when it issued its decision in reliance upon an inaccmate and now
outdated COMPAS assessment. To the extent the Board gave a reason for its decision, they
relied upon a flawed COMPAS assessment that misjudged Mr.
misconduct based on an e1rnneous notation that Mr. -

propensity for prison

had a Tier 3 infraction, when he in

fact did not. In their written decision the Board "heavily weighed" Mr. -

inconect "High"

prison misconduct score and used it as their primruy reason for determining that Mr. would be unable or unwilling to follow the law if released. But that COMP AS assessment was
conected subsequent to the parole heru·ing, and the conected assessment accurately described his
prison misconduct score as "Low." (Compare Bose Aff., Ex. 6, COMPAS Repo1i in Pru·ole File,

with Bose Aff., Ex. 7, Conected COMPAS Report.)
Second, the Boru·d ened when it issued its decision on the basis of a record that was
incomplete and, beyond just the COMPAS assessment, otherwise enoneous. The Board failed to
consider that the record before them was incomplete as it lacked: (i) sentencing minutes from
Justice Failla in Mr. -

underlying conviction (Id. (box checked "No" next to "Sentencing

Minutes")); (ii) an incomplete institutional report (e.g. Mr. -

bi1ih certificate was not

included, which may put into dispute his depo1iation order); and (iii) letters from the police,
district attorney, and sentencing comi (see Bose Aff., Ex. 4, Parole Board Repo1i (box checked
''No" next to "Official Statements")); among other missing records. 2

past 30 years. It failed to meaningfully address the factors it must consider and focused instead on the crime at
issue. It issued a boilerplate decision lacking in individualized analysis. It substituted its judgment as to the
appropriate sentence for the offense for that of the sentencing court and failed to justify its departure from the state' s
own risk assessment tool. Each and every one of these effors merits vacatur, so that the Board can conduct a new
hearing in a manner that c,01nplies with its legal obligations.
2

The tmdersigned has filed a FOIL and a 9 NYCRR § 8000.5 request with Woodboume Coffectional
Facility for the missing docmnents. (See Bose Aff., Exs. 8 and 9.)

2
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Mr. I

I filed a timely Notice of Appeal and Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP

was assigned as pro bono counsel to represent him in connection with his appeal. The
undersigned filed a Notice of Appearance with the Appeals Unit on June 2, 2021. An
administrative appeal of the Boru·d' s decision followed on August 12, 2021. The appeal was
denied on October 15, 2021. This action followed.
The Boru·d's denial of Mr. -

parole violated New York State Executive Law,

C01Tections Law, administrative regulations, and controlling state case law. Accordingly, Mr.
-

seeks vacatur of the Boru·d's decision and a de novo pru·ole hearing conducted in

compliance with controlling law.
FACTS

Petitioner refers the Court to the facts set forth in his Verified Petition for Relief Pursuant
to Alticle 78.
ARGUMENT

Under Aliicle 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, this Comi may vacate a
decision of the New York State Board of Parole when it is "made in violation of lawful
procedure, was affected by an eITor of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of
discretion." N.Y. CPLR § 7803(3). Upon such a showing, "[t]he proper remedy is ... a new
hearing" before the Boru·d. Kelloggv. New York State Board ofParole, 159 A.D.3d 439,442
(1st Dep't 2018). Because the Boru·d's decision relied upon an inaccurate record and was
contrru·y to law, ru·bitrary, and capricious, it should be vacated. Where the Board bases its
decision on eIToneous infonnation, its decision is subject to de novo review. See Lewis v. Travis,
9 A.D.3d 800 (3d Dep' t 2004). ("Board incoITectly refeITed to petitioner's conviction as murder
in the first degree, when, in fact, petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree.

3
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Inasmuch as the Board relied on incorrect infonnation in denying petitioner's request for parole
release, the judgment must be reversed and a new hearing granted.") (emphasis added.)

I.

FOUR TECHNICAL ERRORS IN THE RECORD MERIT VACATUR AND DE
NOVO REVIEW

The record before the Board during M r . - Febmaiy 9, 2021 parole hearing
contained at least four eITors. First, the Boai·d relied on an inaccurate COMPAS Risk and Needs
Assessment that was only coITected by the prison Counselor after the hearing. Second, the
Board relied on a version of Mr. I

I re-entry plan that contained e1rnrs including a release

address that was incoITectly recorded by his prison Counselor. Third, the Board considered an
order of deportation that is not only missing from the record, but is also likely eIToneous, as Mr.
-

maintains that his birth ce1tificate, which is also missing from the record, will prove his

United States citizenship. Fomth, the record the Board considered is also missing statements
from defense counsel and District Attorney, and sentencing minutes. Each of these errors are
independent grounds for annulling Mr. A.

parole denial and granting a de novo interview.

First Technical Error - The Board Relied on an Inaccurate COMPAS
Assessment to Justify its Denial Decision

The Board's decision should be vacated because it was premised on a flawed COMPAS
risk assessment repo1t that the Depaiiment of Corrections and Community Supervision coITected
on Maid1 9, 2021, one month after Mr. -

parole boai·d hearing. (Bose Aff. , Ex. 7,

CoITected COMPAS at 4 ("Enclosed please find your coITected COMPAS Risk Assessment."))
The Board cited an older, eIToneous COMPAS repo1t multiple times in reaching its decision,
specifically giving additional weight to an incoITectly notated "High" prison misconduct rating in
explaining its rationale for denying M r . - parnle. (Bose Aff., Ex. 6, Enoneous COMP AS.)
The con ected COMPAS risk repo1t scores Mr. -

at a low risk for eve1y factor, including

prison misconduct. (Bose Aff. , Ex. 7, CoITected COMPAS.)
4
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I discipline and [his] COMPAS Risk

Assessment" and that while it "does not depart from [his] low/unlikely COMPAS risk scores,"
the Board "however weighs heavily the high risk score/or prison misconduct." (Bose Aff., Ex.
3 at 15 (emphasis added).) The COMPAS report before the Commissioners eIToneously showed
his Prison Misconduct score to be "High- 8." (Bose Aff., Ex. 6, EIToneous COMPAS.)
However, the corrected COMPAS score shows Mr. -

Prison Misconduct score is actually

a "Low-1." (Bose Aff., Ex. 7, CoITected COMPAS.) The Board expressed particular concern
that Mr. I

I institutional accomplishments were outweighed by the eIToneous "high risk

score for prison misconduct." (Id.) That is, the Board's decision hinged on Mr. -

high

score for prison misconduct-but this score was based on inaccurate information.
The increase in Mr. I

I repo1ted risk of prison misconduct between his 2019

COMPAS repo1t and 2021 COMPAS report is based upon an eITor in the answer to Question 16,
"Total# of Tier 3 infractions during in (sic) the last 24 months of incarceration." The 2019
COMPAS repo1t upon which the Board based its parole denial inaccurately notes that Mr.
-

has had one Tier 3 infraction in the past 24 months. (Bose Aff., Ex. 6, Eirnneous

COMP AS at 3.) This incoITect notation increased his prison misconduct score-a score that the
Board weighed heavily in aITiving at its decision not to grant parole. (Bose Aff. , Ex. 3 at 15.)
The coITected 2021 COMPAS repo1i shows that the coITect answer to the number of Tier 3
infractions Mr. -

incuITed in the past 24 months was in fact zero, demonstrating that his

prison misconduct score was actually "low." (Bose Aff., Ex. 7, CoITected COMPAS at 7.)
Because the Board's decision explicitly relied on an eIToneous COMPAS score to deny
parole release by affording the score heavy weight, the Board's decision must be vacated.
Rivera v. Stanford, 2019 WL 2030503, at *2 (2d Dep't 2019).

5
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B.

Second Technical E"or - The Board Failed to Meaningfully Consider Mr.
. . . . Reentry Plans

The Board's governing statute explicitly requires the Board to consider "release plans
including comml.lillty resources, employment, education and training and suppo1t services
available to the inmate" in making a release decision. N.Y. Exec. Law§ 259-i(c)(A)(iii). Yet,
just like with his COMPAS repo1t, the Board failed to consider Mr. -

coITected reenhy

plan in rendering its decision. Since the Board considered failed to consider a statutorily
required factor, the denial was arbiti-a1y and capricious and must be vacated.
Mr. I

I application for parole included a comprehensive reentiy plan, including

documented familial and comml.lillty support, Bose Aff. , Ex. 2 at 22-32, and a letter of
reasonable assurance of a job offer upon his release, id. at 20. However, as Mr. -

testified

and as was documented, see Bose Aff., Exs. 10 and 11, his parole file contained an inc01Tect
release address. The Board improperly considered and weighed this eITor against Mr. The Board noted that Mr. -

"provided a proposed residence other than that noted in the

record," Bose Aff., Ex. 3 at 15, but failed to consider Mr. -

testimony that his counselor

"did this wrong ... the other [address] isn' t put there," and that his "counselor said to fix it ... when
I aITived [at the hearing]." Id. at 7-8. DOCCS later noted the eITor. (Bose Aff., Ex. 7 at 4 ("Per
our conversation the address noted on your Parole BoaTd Report can be updated if you are
granted a De Novo appearance."))
Despite this written evidentiary record, it appears that the Board failed to give meaningful
consideration to a factor it is statutorily required to consider. As such, its decision was arbitrary
and capricious. See Mayfield v. Evans, 93 A.D.3d 98, 110 (1st Dep't 2012) ("[T]he absence of a
detailed decision inappropriately foreclosed the possibility of intelligent review of the Parole
Board member's reasons. "). Indeed, Comts have regularly granted Article 78 petitions seeking
6
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review of Board decisions that, like in Mr. I

I case, fail to consider all of the statuto1y

parole factors. See, e.g., Mitchell v. N.Y State Div. ofParole, 58 A.D.3d 742, 743 (2d Dep't
2009). Fmther, comts have held that, when the Board fails to consider all relevant statuto1y
factors, as it did in Mr. -

case, it is "a strong indication that the denial of petitioner's

application was a foregone conclusion." Johnson v. New York State Div. ofParole, 65 A.D .3d
838, 839 (4th Dep' t 2009) (citingKingv. NY State Div. ofParole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 431-32 (1st
Dept. 1993), ajf'd, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994)). When the Boai-d prejudges an applicant's case, as it
did here, that is grounds for vacatur. King, 190 A.D.2d at 434.

C.

Third Technical E"or - The Board Failed to Meaningfully Consider Mr.
Citizenship Claim

The Board must consider an applicant's innnigration status when rendering a parole
decision. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (iv) ("any depo1tation order issued by the federal
government against the inmate while in the custody of the department and any reconnnendation
regarding deportation made by the commissioner of the department...shall be considered."). fu
this instance, the Board focused mostly on the seriousness of the crime of conviction during the
interview. Due to the incomplete parole file before them, including the Inissing depo1tation
order and Inissing biith ce1tificate, the Board failed to meaningfully consider Mr. -

claim

that he was born in Westchester, NY and is therefore a United States citizen..
The Board decision states: "The record notes an order of deportation. You have asserted
being born in Westchester, New York." (Bose Aff., Ex. 3 at 15.) It appears that the Boai-d was
not provided with the entiI·e record, including Mr. -

biith ce1tificate. Instead of

considering the complete parole file, including Mr. I

I birth ce1tificate, which will show

whether Mr.

is a United States citizen, the Board relied on an inaccurate record- a parole

file that does not include a physical deportation order. Inmate records demonstrate that DOCCS
7
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I and the undersigned

have both made attempts to secme it. See Bose Aff., Exs. 8, 9 and 12.
Because the Board failed to meaningfully consider a factor that it is statutorily requi.t·ed to
consider, its decision must be vacated. Johnson, 65 A.D.3d at 839; King, 190 A.D.2d at 431-32.

D.

Fourth Technical Error - The Board Failed to Request and Consider
Statements from Mr.
Defense Counsel or the District Attorney, and
did not Consider Mr.
Sentencing Minutes

When making a parole decision, the Board must consider "the recommendations of the
sentencing comt, the district attorney and the attorney who represented the inmate in connection
with the conviction for which the inmate is cmTently incarcerated." 9 NYCRR 8002.2(d)(7).
The Board did not consider those recommendations here because they had not been sought for
yearn.
The Board briefly, and confusingly, addressed the absence ofletters from Mr. . . . .
trial defense counsel, the trial judge, and the New York County District Attorney. The Board
stated: "It's customruy that we write judges, defense attorneys and the DA regru·ding the
possibility of yom release, we did not get any response from them so we will continue without
thei.t· input." (Bose Aff., Ex. 3 at 10.) The Board si.tnply noted the practice that was
customruy- it did not state anywhere in the transcript or decision that it affomatively attempted
reachmg out to any of the necessa1y pa1ties in the lead up to the heru·ing.
The Parole Boru·d Repo1t supports the fact that the Board conducted no such outreach in
over seven years. After checking the "No" box after both Official Statements from the judge,
District Attorney, and defense counsel, and also after Sentencing Minutes, it states that the last
time such statements and minutes were requested was on December 19, 2013, and that at the
time ofrequest, such statements were "Unavailable." (Bose Aff., Ex. 4 at 1.) According to the
Pru·ole Board Report, the last ti.tne statements and sentencing minutes were requested was almost
8
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8 years ago. There is nothing on the rep01t to indicate that the Board requested the statements at
issue again as the hearing approached. Because the Board apparently declined to contact the
judge, district attorney, or defense counsel, and, thus, did not consider any statement they might
have made regarding Mr. -

it failed to consider a required factor in reaching the decision at

issue.
Additionally, the Board appears not to have considered the minutes from Mr. . . . .
1992 sentencing hearing. (Bose Aff. , Ex. 4, Parole Board Repo1t (box checked ''No" next to
"Sentencing Minutes").) These minutes would demonstrate that Justice Failla chose to give Mr.
-

a sentence range below the statutory minimum-15-years-to-life on each attempted

murder charge instead of 20-to-life, for an aggregate sentence of 30-years-to-life, a considerable

departure from the statutory minimum sentence of 40-years-to-life. The transcript of Mr.
. . . . parole hearing and the Board's written decision are devoid of any reference to Justice
Failla's decision or to any other aspect of the sentencing minutes. The Board ened by neglecting
to consider sentencing minutes in which the judge "implicitly addressed" parole by, for example,
"imposing less than the maximum on the lower range where [the judge] had discretion," as
Justice Failla did here. See Matter ofDuffy v. NY State Dep 't of Corr. & Cmty. Superv;sion,
132 A.D.3d 1207, 1208 (3d Dep' t 2015); Canales v. Hammock, 105 Misc. 2d 71 , 74, 431
N .Y.S.2d 787, 790 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (Board committed reversible enor in failing to review
sentencing judge's minutes).
Because the Board failed to consider statutorily required factors, its decision must be
reversed.
II.

THE BOARD'S DENIAL OF PAROLE WAS STATED IN CONCLUSORY
TERMS AND BOILERPLATE LANGUAGE, AND FAILED TO ADDRESS THE
FIRST PRONG OF EXECUTIVE LAW§ 259-I(2)(C)(A), VIOLATING THE

9
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EXECUTIVE LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS

When the Board declines to grant parole, it is required by statute to provide a decision "in
writing ... of the factors and reasons for such denial of parole. Such reasons shall be given in
detail and not in conclusory te1ms." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a); see In re Rossakis v. NY.
State Bd. OfParole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 28 (1st Dep't 2016); In re Ramirez, 118 A.D.3d 707, 707

(2d Dep 't 2014). Specifically, the Board must explain its decision with reference to the factors
for parole set forth in Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A), i.e., (1) why there is a reasonable
probability that the parole applicant would violate the law if released, (2) why release would be
incompatible with the welfare of society, and (3) why release would so deprecate the seriousness
of the offense as to unde1mine respect for the law. A failure to address each of these factors-as
occuned here-is cause to vacate the denial and grant a de novo hearing.
The Board's decision contains only a cursory reference to the first hvo prongs, and omits
any reference to the third prong of Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A), which requires it to consider
why release would so deprecate the seriousness of the offense as to unde1mine respect for the
law. The Board' s failure to explain how, or if, it considered this prong also violates its own
regulations. See 9 § NYCRR 8002.3. Section 8002.3 states that " [r]easons for the denial of
parole release shall be given in detail, and shall, in factually individualized and non-concluso1y
tenns, address how the applicable parole decision-making principles and factors listed in 8002.2
were considered in the individual's case." Id. This oversight merits vacatur of the Board's
decision.
Next, the Board's decision in this matter is akin to the one vacated by the comi in In re
McBride v. Evans, 42 Misc.3d 1230(A), slip op. at *3 (Sup. Ct., Dutchess Cty, 2014). As the

court explained in that case:

10
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While the Board discussed petitioner's positive activities and
accomplishments at the hearing, it then concluded that his release
was incompatible with "public safety and welfare." The Board
gave no analysis as to how or why it reached this conclusion. It
appears to havefocused only on petitioner's past behavior without
aiiiculating a rational basis for reaching its conclusion that his
release would be incompatible with the welfare of society at this
time.

Id. (emphasis added)
While the Boai·d purpo1ied to consider the first and second prongs it must address under
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(A), it summarily concluded that Mr. . . . . release "would be
incompatible with the welfare and safety of society." (Bose Aff., Ex. 3.) The third prong is not
considered even cursorily. The Board's reliance on such boile1plate language without providing
any explanation about how it reached this cursory conclusion is insufficient to demonstrate that it
meaningfully balanced these factors. See Coaxum v. NY State Bd. ofParole, 14 Misc. 3d 661 ,
668, 827 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty., 2006) ("The decision making is a process of
dete1mining which factors outweigh others: a balancing process."); Weinstein v. Dennison, 7
Misc. 3d 1009(A), slip op. at *8 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., 2005) ("[T]he Boai·d is required to do more
than merely mouth the statuto1y criteria ... ").
The remainder of the Boai·d's decision likewise lacked sufficient detail, in violation of
controlling statutes and caselaw. The Board summarily noted Mr. . . . . "Case Plan,
institutional adjustment, release plans, your discipline and your COMPAS Risk Assessment" and
did not address these factors in detail but instead summai·ily concluded that they were
outweighed by Mr. . . . . "disciplinai·y histo1y," and erroneous, see infra Section C, "high
risk for prison misconduct." (See Bose Aff., Ex. 3 at 15.) This rote recitation is not only
factua lly inaccurate (as it is based on the outdated COMPAS Risk Assessment), but it also falls
short of what is required to substantiate a denial of pai·ole. See In Re Rossakis, 146 A.D.3d at 28
11
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(holding that the Parole Board violated the statuto1y requirement that the reasons for denial not
be conclusory when it "summarily listed petitioner 's institutional achievements, and then denied
parole with no further analysis of them").
Similar to In re McBride v. Evans, the Board ' s decision here did not address or explain its
conclusion that Mr. . . . . many positive factors were outweighed by crimes Mr. -

was

found to have committed 30 years ago. Furthe1more, without a detailed explanation of this
dete1mination and of how the Board considered the statuto1y factors in Mr. I
-

is unable to prepare sufficiently for future parole hearings, beyond curs01y advice to

"spend ... time cleaning up your discipline, adhering to facility rnles, and clarifying your release
plans." See In re Greene v. Smith, 52 A.D.2d 292, 294 (4th Dep't. 1976) (explaining that " [t]he
objective in requiring the board to furnish reasons is to guide and to aid the prisoner in his
endeavor to return to society as a useful citizen").
Because the Board failed to consider statutorily required factors, its decision must be
vacated.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court enter au order:
1. Annulling the decision of Respondent, dated February 9, 2021, denying Petitioner
parnle release; and
2. Directing Respondent to immediately afford Petitioner a new, de novo parole
release hearing before a new panel that does not include any commissioner who
has previously denied Mr. -

release, at which Respondent shall consider all

appropriate statuto1y factors governing parole release dete1minations; and
3. Granting such additional relief as the Comt deems just and proper.

12
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Dated: Februaiy 11, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

New York, New York
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